

Chapter 1 – Why are Religious Terrorists so Lethal?

Q: What makes the effectiveness of Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban, and the Mahdi Army more surprising than the effectiveness of Al Qaeda?

Q: Has the death toll from terrorist attacks risen or fallen since 9/11? What does this imply about the Global War on Terrorism?

Q: Are radical religious terrorist groups less lethal or more lethal than secular terrorist groups? By how much?

Q: What is meant by the term *religious radical*? What implications should be avoided?

Q. Are terrorists typically psychopaths? How do we know? Are terrorists typically motivated by theology? How do we know?

Q. Why do you think it is important, in discussing the motivations of terrorists, to formulate refutable hypotheses, and methodically expose them to data? Give examples.

Q: What are some objections to the “club” model? What are its strengths?

Chapter 2 – The Defection Constraint

Q: Why are rebel groups so much more vulnerable to defection than to attrition?

Q: What attribute of the Taliban made it so much more effective at controlling trade routes than rival Afghan groups? Why?

Q: How do defections constraints affect the ability of a militant group to capture strategic locations?

Q: Why do the individual rewards for a successful terrorist attack and the individual rewards for defection scale differently?

Chapter 3 – Sects, Prohibition, and Mutual Aid

Q: Why are so many ultra-Orthodox Jews non-participants in the labor force?

Q: Does the prospect of an long draft deferral alone prompt ultra-Orthodox men to stay in yeshiva?

Q: The return to education is much higher for secular universities than it is for ultra-Orthodox education. What purpose does prolonged ultra-Orthodox education serve?

Q: Did the late 90's currency crisis in Indonesia increase religiosity among rural rice farmers? Why or why not?

Q: How do religious prohibitions strengthen religious sects?

Q: What is the *Hutterite standard*? What two factors predict the extraordinarily high fertility of radical religious organizations?

Q: Is the prediction of higher fertility in Islamic radical religious clubs, as well as Christian and Jewish radical religious clubs, borne out by the data from those parts of the world?

Chapter 4 – Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice

Q: What is the purpose of sacrifice in maintaining the cohesion of radical religious clubs?

Q: Outside of radical religious clubs, what are some other examples of organizations requiring sacrifices for membership?

Q: How did the split in the ultra-Orthodox political party help provide evidence that subsidies of ultra-Orthodox groups affected behavior? What did they find?

Q: What concept from the club model explains the effects of these government subsidies on ultra-Orthodox groups?

Q: How can religious radicalism be measured?

Chapter 5 – The Hamas Model

Q: What aspect of the prohibitions practiced by radical religious clubs loosens the defection constraint on attainable violent activities by club members?

Q: Besides a lack of outside options, how do terrorist organizations based on radical religious clubs know that they can trust members with sensitive operation details?

Q: How can a terrorist organization following the Hamas model prevent non-members from working against them by alerting authorities?

Q: Do we find that terrorist organizations which also provide social services are generally more lethal or less lethal than terrorist organizations which do not? What explains this difference?

Q: What is the “Hearts and Minds” approach to insurgency?

Q: What do rebel organizations gain by having operatives inflict violence upon the local population?

Q: Many members of terrorist organizations, often the ones who carry out the deadliest attacks, are highly educated and well-off. These members clearly have outside options. Does the defection constraint apply to them? Does this suggest a problem with the club model? Why or why not?

Q: If organizations following the Hamas Model provide social services to nonmembers, what benefit does membership incur?

Chapter 6 – Why Suicide Attacks?

Q: Where did most of the suicide attacks during the second Palestinian Intifada take place? What explains the high proportion of attacks in this location and not others?

Q: Most suicide attacks target people of a different religion than the attacker. What logical conclusion does *not* explain this fact? What does explain it?

Q: Which organizations were more lethal when carrying out suicide attacks during the second Intifada? Given what we know about radical religious organizations, why should we expect this to be the case?

Chapter 7 – Constructive Counterterrorism

Q: How did Yasser Arafat shut down Black September? Why do you think this approach was effective?

Q: List the six ways terrorist clubs succeed in reducing defection.

Q: International aid organizations sometimes allow aid to be distributed by rebel groups. This is an effective way of delivering humanitarian aid to people in areas controlled by these groups. Why might it be a bad idea?

Q: The U.S. Army offered residents of Sadr city \$10 to help clean up the streets. Was the program popular? Was it effective in undermining insurgents? Why or why not?

Q: What does “the first 10%” refer to? What is the other 90%?

Q: What are some of the problems governments and international aid organizations face in trying to provide social services to populations in areas controlled by rebel groups?

Chapter 8 – Religious Radicals and Violence in the Modern World

Q: Does theology predict lethality of violent groups?

Q: Why do theology and service-providing clubs seem to go hand in hand, rather than secular clubs?

Q: The 16th century saw an explosion of Christian denominations competing with the Catholic Church. Why had this not happened earlier? What changed?

Q: In what sense were the rebels of Münster like a club? Is it fair to label them Christian Jihadists?

Q: The 18th century saw the rise of two new Jewish traditions. What were they? How were they different? What explains the difference?

Q: How did Adam Smith and David Hume differ in their prescriptions for religious tolerance?

Q: What innovation in government with respect to religion did the United States of America adopt? How did it change the motivations of religious groups?